








In these four addresses, I have been assessing the causes and some consequences of 
Britain’s transition to mass education at both secondary and tertiary levels since the Second 
World War.   Against the run of the literature, which has focused on elite, expert and activist 
discourses (politicians, psychological and sociological critics of selection, economists, 
teachers, campaigning groups), I have attributed the rush to mass education to the rising 
aspiration among the majority of parents and children for more and better education that was 
apparent across the developed (and now the developing) world throughout the second half of 
the 20
th
 century.  In Britain’s specifically democratic and welfarist context, the demand for a 
high-quality education for all, that is, a democratic discourse of education, parallel to the 
demand for high-quality health care, overwhelmed a relatively new and fragile meritocratic 
discourse which focused energies and resources on an elite.  To put it another way, mass 
demand elicited mass supply.  In plumbing the consequences of mass education, I have also 
tried to give voice to parents and children, making use of economists’ and sociologists’ data 
to track their behaviours and experiences whether or not these were articulated in popular 
discourse.  Thus in my third address I placed, alongside the limited evidence we have about 
ordinary citizens’ aspirations for social mobility, the vast body of sometimes inscrutable data 
that testifies to the impact that educational opportunity had – or didn’t have – on the realities 
of social mobility.  In this final address I turn to the impact of mass participation on the 
content of education – what in the technical literature is called ‘subject choice’.   Just as 
access to education had a lot more to do with demand for it than expert discourse would 
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suggest, so the content of education was very largely determined by shifting demand for 
particular subjects, probably moreso in Britain than many of its comparators because of the 
lack of central curricular control, and the wide range of choices facing parents and children at 
points as early as age 13 and continuing past compulsory education to ages 16 and 18.    
For this purpose I have assembled from educational statistics data about subject 
uptake at O Level and GCSE, A Level and undergraduate degree level from the 1950s to the 
present, and once again I have turned to data, argument and theory supplied by the social 
sciences to seek to augment and interpret these statistics and to explain changes in subject 
choice over time.  Once again I encounter the familiar problem that each of these social-
scientific disciplines is siloed in its own favoured data series and corresponding explanatory 
framework.  Empirical studies of subject choice based on student surveys invariably find a 
mix of factors – interest, enjoyment, ability, earnings potential, career choice – but are 
relatively uninquisitive about what might generate these evaluations and how and why they 
change over time.  Driven as they often are by the interests of guidance counsellors, they tend 
to conclude with homilies about the need for more information and better guidance.
1
  
Psychologists pin subject choice to personality type;  in one famous study of the 1960s, 
dividing ‘clever schoolboys’ into conformist ‘convergers’ who favoured Physics and Classics 
and dissenting ‘divergers’ who leant towards the Arts and Biology.2  Sociologists, especially 
in their stern 1970s phase, have tended to see subject choice as a myth, given the 
determinative role of the habitus in sorting children by gender and social class, a role they 
give a twist by identifying teachers as the agents who steer children into their socially-
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  Economists for their part tend to attribute subject choice to rational 
behaviours based on future earnings.
4
  Historians, insofar as they are tempted to address 
subject choice at all, have their own favoured cultural and political explanations – favoured in 
part because anthropologists and political scientists are not competing in this field, but also 
because these explanations draw on the evidence and actors with which we are most 
comfortable;  this is what causes us to tend towards elite, expert and activist explanations, for 
which the evidence is textual and archival.   We should, of course, try to combine all of these 
sources and their accompanying explanatory frameworks – giving due weight to the 
otherwise muted majority of our fellow citizens who speak mostly through surveys and 
quantitative data, however rebarbative we find those sources of evidence – and that is what I 
will try to do. 
One further interpretive wrinkle is worth ironing out at the outset.  Insofar as there is 
an articulated public discourse about subject choice, it has been almost entirely – again – an 
elite, politicians’ and policymakers’ discourse, in all parties, about the choice for science.  
Especially from the late 1950s, when economists and industrialists began to bear down on 
educational policy, the public discourse about subject choice has been dominated by the 
alleged insufficiency of science (or what we now call STEM) and policy has been aimed 
almost exclusively at remedying that insufficiency.  How misleading this discourse is as a 
guide to actual behaviours is clear from the brute fact that there has been a nearly continuous 
swing away from science from the early-to-mid-1960s up until the last few years.  This you 
would never guess from the public discourse, which at every step of the way is always 
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detecting (as a way of advocating for) a swing towards science, undaunted by repeated waves 
of evidence to the contrary.   But as a result we have a great deal more writing about why 
students choose the sciences than about why they don’t, and choose instead other subjects in 
the humanities and social sciences.  It is not only local patriotism, therefore, that will cause 
me to dwell upon the choice of other subjects – with the choice of History of course always in 
the back of my mind – but also the need to rectify a glaring omission in the literature.5  As in 
previous addresses, I will proceed chronologically, starting with the immediate postwar 
period, and then identifying the distinctive features of the 1960s, a period of expansion in 
post-compulsory education;  the 1970s and ‘80s, a period of almost complete stasis;  and the 
period since the late 1980s, a period of very rapid expansion;  the last few years, since the 
slump of 2008, may form a distinctive period of its own, though, as we historians like to say, 
it is too soon to tell.  As this chronology suggests, what students choose to study is closely 
linked to the question of who are the students studying at any given point – what the social 
scientists might call cohort effects. 
I 
Despite the impression given by C.P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’ controversy at the end of 
the 1950s, post-compulsory education in the decade or so after the war was led by the 
sciences – and this was very largely a cohort effect.  When the Robbins Committee looked 
into the matter in 1963, it found that 57% of full-time undergraduate students were on 
science, technology and medical courses against only 43% in the arts, a rough division which 
had remained nearly unchanged since 1938, when the balance was 55% to 45%, although 
there had been a marked swing within the science subjects away from medicine and towards 
pure science.  If there was a ‘two cultures’ problem, it was not a higher education problem in 
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general, but rather an Oxbridge problem, where the proportion of arts students was much 
higher than elsewhere – more than twice as high as at London and the larger civic institutions 
– and indeed the ‘two cultures’ controversy took place very largely on Oxbridge ground 
(another example of an elite discourse fixing determinedly on an elite).
6
  But in the secondary 
schools and universities of the nation at large, science was king.  Maths and Physics were the 
most popular subjects at A Level and Chemistry had as many passes as English and History,  
which were the leading Arts subjects.
7
   At university, the ‘Arts’ were occasionally described 
as ‘the most popular group of subjects’ but this conclusion was reached only by treating 
science, medicine and technology as separate groups.
8
  In reality, Britain had one of the 
highest proportions of science and technology graduates in Europe.
9
 
Why should this have been?  Britain, England especially, had then a very 
academically focused and selective secondary education system, and also one, though 
Scotland less so, that channeled pupils narrowly from exams at 16 to exams at 18 to 
university.  It was also, in common with most European systems, a post-compulsory 
education dominated by boys and by traditionally male occupations.
10
  For grammar-school 
leavers at 16, for example, the single most common destination was an engineering 
apprenticeship.
11
  After 16, schooling was closely linked to the graduate labour market and 
that labour market was itself led by a few overwhelmingly male professions that favoured the 
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sciences:  medicine above all, but also engineering and management.
12
   Law would not be a 
majority graduate profession until the 1960s and accountancy not until the 1970s.
13
   
Accordingly a majority of boys specialized in science at A Level, and boys with science at A 
Level were the most likely of all 18 year olds to apply to and to be accepted at university.
14
  
The saving grace for the arts was teaching, which was the single largest graduate recruiter – 
about a third of all graduates ended up in teaching – and, although of course schools required 
science as well as arts teachers, in fact more trained as arts teachers, especially women.  As 
late as 1961 80% of female arts graduates ended up as teachers.
15
  Although the situation was 
quite other at Oxbridge – 86% of Oxford undergraduates in 1950 were doing arts degrees, vs. 
45% nationally, the kind of thing that aroused C.P. Snow’s very-Oxbridge centred ire in the 
two cultures controversy
16
 – across the country in grammar schools, independent schools and 
universities the tone was set by serious young men beavering away at Maths, Physics and 
Chemistry.   
In these circumstances, it is a little surprising that government and punditry spent so 
much time and effort trying to produce more scientists at all levels.  But in the immediate 
postwar period – especially from the mid-1950s when fears of ‘relative decline’ were 
building – all parties converged on investment in education for economic growth, and 
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economic growth was widely held to mean technology-fuelled industry.   This line of 
thinking took two different forms.  The earlier but persisting form, associated largely but not 
exclusively with socialists, was manpower planning.  The Attlee government explicitly set 
targets for the production of graduate scientists and technologists in the name of ‘national 
needs’ and these targets were regularly re-set and monitored by the Committee on Scientific 
Manpower throughout the ‘50s and into the ‘60s.17  At the end of the ‘50s, a vaguer but more 
powerful current emerged, amongst economic theorists and politicians alike, which saw 
education more generally as an investment in ‘human capital’.  ‘Human capital’ theory had 
the attraction to Conservatives that it did not require too much government intervention – 
neither strong-arming the universities nor pressurizing employers – and it had the attraction 
to all politicians that it did not require making forecasts and setting targets which were too 
easily foiled by events.
18
  It did require throwing money at education – which the 
Conservative governments of the late 1950s did – and trusting to supply and demand, and the 
promises of human-capital theory, that such investments would yield growth.
19
  Until the end 
of the 1950s this policy seemed to be working – as educational participation began to extend, 
first at GCE and then at degree level, there was a distinct swing to science at A Level (though 
less so at degree level), and it was assumed that this build-up would translate automatically 
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  But then, around 1960, just when anxieties about economic decline were 
peaking – the two cultures controversy, which was then raging, a case in point – it stopped 
working.  The famous ‘swing away from science’ had begun. 
II 
I say the ‘famous’ swing away from science, but it is not as famous as it should be;  it 
has not been the subject of any historical research and it rarely if ever appears in histories of 
the 1960s, or even of education in the 1960s.
21
  Yet it is one of those telling markers of great 
social and cultural change in ‘the Sixties’, and like other such markers – including 
educational expansion itself, to which it is closely linked – it is fascinatingly determined by a 
number of possibly independent yet simultaneous changes in the fabric of society. 
The ‘swing from science’ was first brought to wide public attention by the Robbins 
Committee in its October 1963 report.  Robbins had commissioned a number of surveys of 
the flow from schools to universities to labour market and had appreciated that, at the very 
least, the ‘gradual swing towards science’ at A Level in the 1950s was ‘no longer in 
evidence’.  The Robbins Report itself was moderately sanguine about this;   Lionel Robbins, 
a Conservative economist, was no friend of manpower planning, and neither really was his 
left-leaning adjutant Claus Moser.   ‘The majority of graduates will, we hope, be sufficiently 
versatile to be capable of varied employment’, they wrote mildly in the main report.22  But 
the swing continued – 42% of A Level candidates followed a primarily scientific course in 
1962 and only 31% in 1967.
23
  With the advent of C.P. Snow as Minister of Technology and 
a Labour government red-hot for science and technology, more susceptible than most to the 
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siren song of manpower planning, in the mid-1960s the ‘swing from science’ became a major 
public issue and a political problem.
24
  An enquiry was set afoot in 1964 with Sir Fred 
Dainton, chemist and Vice-Chancellor of Nottingham, in the chair.  Just as Claus Moser had 
done much of the footwork for Robbins, so a student of Moser’s, Celia Phillips, did much of 
the footwork for Dainton.
25
  Dainton’s final report in 1968 essentially extended the ‘two 
cultures controversy’ into the late 1960s by arguing for vigorous action against the swing on 
both economic and cultural grounds.  The ‘Dainton swing’, as it was sometimes now known, 
gave Dainton 
cause for concern not only in relation to a future supply of qualified manpower 
which in consequence might possibly prove inadequate to the nation’s needs, 
but also as a symptom of a condition in which science may be losing the 




Dainton was not so interested in the causes of his swing as in the levers to reverse it, mostly 
drawn from manpower planning.
27
  For explanations we have to turn elsewhere.  These varied 
greatly depending on the vested interests but also the disciplinary preferences of the 
commentators. 
One explanation – the one most prevalent at the time, and Dainton’s favourite – we 
can discard pretty readily.  This attributed the swing to the English system’s exceptionally 
early specialization.  Early specialization had become a bugbear in the ‘two cultures’ 
controversy, and criticized (as ‘subject-mindedness’) in the wake of the 1959 Crowther 
Report on secondary education.
28
  As the swing had not then begun, the argument then 
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focused on the need for a good general education in both arts and sciences at least through 18 
if not beyond.  Once the swing began, the same fault could be blamed for the ‘English 
disease’ of cultural backwardness and economic decline.  But as even Dainton admitted the 
swing was an international phenomenon of the 1960s unrelated to school specialization.
29
  
The clinching evidence came from Scotland, which saw a similar swing despite its much 
delayed subject specialization.  In the end, Dainton could not explain why being forced to 
study science or maths to 16 or 18 would make pupils more likely to choose to study it at 
university.  As Scotland showed, it didn’t.30 
As awareness of the transnational nature of the swing grew – with evidence from the 
OECD emerging that Britain had a relatively high level of science take-up at university, and 
that it was hardly alone in experiencing the swing – cultural explanations gained purchase, 
and these were no longer solely in the doom-laden ‘two cultures’ vein.31  At least from the 
mid-‘60s, a general disillusionment with science and technology amongst the young was 
detected, which could be put in positive as well as negative terms, as ‘a concern for people 
rather than things’, or, as the social psychologist G.N. Carstairs noted, a move  
away from doing and towards feeling.  The young seem less interested in 
science, factual knowledge and cognitive mastery in general – the very skills 
which underlie technical efficiency.  Instead they seem to express a mood of 
irrationality;  they delight in fantasy. ..the exaltation of inner freedom, of the 
exploration of subjective experiences, the fullest possible realisation of one’s 
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personality.  Self-discovery and self-fulfilment are seen as the supreme good 
and anything which cramps these endeavours is deplored. 
 
Surveys of schools in the late 1960s confirmed this vague presentiment, more prosaically.   
 
Heads felt that some of the glamour had left science careers, whereas it was 
becoming known that interesting careers were available to arts graduates.  
Many heads had observed the attraction of the socio-economic group of 
subjects for an increasing number of pupils, and it is possible that there is a 




Most intriguingly, an A Level General Studies examination in 1969 actually asked students 
(as an exam question) to ‘Try to account for the fact that the number of students wishing to 
study arts and social sciences is increasing more rapidly than the numbers wishing to study 
the natural sciences’.  The answers came back that the sciences were boring, had a bad public 
image, and lacked opportunities for self-expression, whereas the arts, at least for girls, 
reflected ‘their desire to help the community directly through social action’.33 
This shift in atittudes, cited by Derek Duckworth who did the most thorough studies 
of the ‘swing’ in the 1970s, connects to two other explanations which dovetail with and 
perhaps lie behind the cultural explanation.  The first is a strong cohort effect.  When A Level 
and higher education expand rapidly, as they did in the 1960s, a new demographic comes into 
play.  Less academically qualified pupils, from families with no previous exposure to post-
compulsory education, enter the cohort.  In Duckworth’s sample of Lancashire grammar-
school pupils in the early 1970s, Maths, Physics and Chemistry were regarded as the hardest 
subjects.  (English, Geography and History were the easiest.)  Though the sciences did 
somewhat better in terms of interest, freedom and social benefit, their difficulty proved a 
great sticking point to new entrants.  (Latin and French did poorly on all scores.)
34
 (Fig. 1)  A 
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second cohort effect, not yet so marked but progressively growing in significance, was 
gender.
35
  Within the sciences, girls were more likely to prefer Biology to Chemistry on 
nearly all grounds.  ‘People rather than things’ could thus favour softer sciences rather than 
the arts, but as a result both cohort effects had a marked effect on the swing away from 
Maths, Physics and Chemistry at both A Level and degree level.
36
 
Another effect which dovetailed with culture and demography was the changing 
labour market.  As we’ve seen, the graduate labour market in the 1950s was led by science-
oriented professions, especially medicine and engineering, though teaching (which favoured 
the arts) was the single most common graduate destination.  When the ‘60s expansion took 
place, it not only changed the demographic makeup, it also changed the nature of the 
graduate labour market.  A wider range of professions and employers were now fishing in a 
graduate pool where previously they could fish their top candidates out of school at 16 or 
18.
37
  There was also at the end of the ‘60s the beginning of a pronounced post-industrial shift 
away from technologically-oriented employment – the over-supply of graduate engineers was 
particularly obvious
38
 – and towards expansion in the public sector, in the helping 
professions, and in retail and management.
39
  It was not so much that these new graduate 
occupations disfavoured science – to the contrary, many science graduates were now 
gravitating towards management
40
 – but rather that they were more neutral as to subject 
choice, and thus in concert with the cultural and demographic shifts students could swing 
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away from science without losing ground in the labour market.  Evidence for this lies, for 
example, in the growing tendency of employers to advertise for graduates without specifying 
degree subject
41
, and the growing tendency of graduates to badge a wider variety of subjects 
(beyond science) as ‘vocational’.42  These trends had the effect of causing the University 
Grants Committee to back off from ‘manpower planning’ as early as 1968.43  They also gave 
the economists pause.  ‘Human-capital’ arguments for investment in higher education became 
less targeted on science and technology and focused rather on widening participation in 
higher education more generally.  In some circles, a new light on the ‘human capital’ value of 
investment in education by the ‘screening hypothesis’, which argued that employers chose 
graduates not for their particular skills but for general qualities of mind or behaviour (or for 
their class background), confident that they could train up such people on the job in whatever 
specific skills were needed.
44
  Though governments never entirely lost their taste for 
manpower planning – and indeed this appetite would revive again in the 1980s under most 
unlikely auspices – nevertheless the whole university system went into the 1970s much more 
oriented to student demand, which allowed students to swing away from science unmolested, 
whatever the reasons that were truly driving them, interest, ability, or vocation.  Even 
Margaret Thatcher’s 1972 White Paper on Education granted that widening participation 
entailed a wider range of motives for education and thus a wider range of subjects, providing 
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‘a stimulating opportunity to come to terms with themselves . . .to discover where their real 
interests and abilities lie’ and catering not only to vocationalism but also ‘personal and social 
action’.45  (This is, perhaps, Thatcher’s hippie moment.) 
Before we consider what students were swinging to, let me just extend my analysis of 
the swing away from science into the 1980s, which will allow us to say something further 
about the causes of the swing, because the period from around 1970 to the late 1980s was a 
period of considerable stability in participation.  Cohort effects, therefore, may have been 
reduced.  And yet the swing away from science continued, and in certain respects accelerated. 
To 1976, at least, the swing away from Maths and Chemistry continued, the swing away from 
Physics slowed (after a very sharp early decline), while Biology surged ahead.
46
  A great deal 
of this must have owed to the slow but remorseless rise in A Level and degree participation 
amongst women.   After about 1976 the swing halted.  Both at A Level and degree level 
science held its share steady, even in Physics and Chemistry.
47
 (Figs. 2, 3)  Contemporaries 
prided themselves that this halting of the swing showed finally that pressure ‘from above’, 
from government, business and punditry, was telling on student demand.  After 1976, the 
year of James Callaghan’s Ruskin speech calling for a return to basics, and more particularly 
after 1979 with the advent of an even more furiously pro-science Conservative government, 
standards were seen to be holding and the ‘difficult’ subjects coming back into vogue.48   
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But even this may have been to some degree a cohort effect.  Although higher 
education participation rates were holding level, more students were enrolling not in 
universities but in the new polytechnics.   The polys had been the brainchild of the 1964 
Labour government and especially of Education Secretary Tony Crosland, part of the master 
plan to reverse the swing away from science in the name of manpower planning.  The degrees 
they awarded through the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA) were at first only 
awarded in science subjects.  But as demand pressures told, the swing away from science 
registered in the polys too.   Science’s share of CNAA degrees gave way steadily throughout 
the 1970s to social studies and humanities courses.
49
  Contemporaries decried this as 
‘academic drift’, polys losing their distinctive sense of mission and apeing the older 
universities.
50
   But the polys were much more sensitive to demand pressures than universities 
– their true mission was to widen participation rather than to steer new entrants towards 
science and technology courses in which they had no interest.
51
   So these new entrants to 
polys in the 1970s, like the new entrants to universities in the 1960s, swung away from 
‘difficult’ courses and no doubt towards the ‘self-discovery’ and ‘self-fulfilment’ held to be 
characteristic of the period.  As polys sopped up new entrants, universities in turn could 
afford to become more selective, attracting more traditional students back to the sciences;  
thus the swing away from science was halted in universities but continued at the 
polytechnics. 
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What, then, were students swinging to, in universities through the mid-1970s and in 
polytechnics through the mid-1980s?   Initially, the swing appeared to go (and perhaps 
inevitably was) to what were then the only alternatives, the humanities.  Although languages 
were already beginning their long-term tumble in the 1960s, English literature enjoyed robust 
growth in the 1960s – in part a gender effect, as English literature was the A Level subject by 
far the most skewed to girls, 2-1 (whereas both History and Geography were mildly skewed 
to boys).  But History and Geography both grew steadily during the most rapid phase of the 
swing to 1972.
52
  After 1972, arts subjects including English Literature level off in absolute 
numbers and experience a mild decline in share at A Level, much as the sciences do. (Fig. 4)  
This relative decline of almost all the established subjects, arts and sciences alike, marks a 
trend towards the introduction of new subjects at A Level that had begun in the 1960s and 
developed further in the 1970s.  The introduction of new subjects itself reflects a growing 
sensitivity to student demand and what subjects are introduced (and popular) tells us more 
about what demand was for.   
There was no popular new subject that could be counted as a science
53
 and only one – 
Art – that could be counted as a humanities subject.  By the 1980s Art was a more popular 
subject at O Level than History.
54
  Most of the popular new subjects fell in an entirely new 
area, allegedly between arts and sciences, which became known as ‘social studies’, including 
Economics, Sociology and Business.   Economics had been offered at both O and A Level in 
the 1950s but had very limited take-up (only 1 or 2,000 passes a year at A Level);  by 1972 it 
had overtaken History, with 27,000 passes.  An entirely new subject, Sociology, gained 
growing numbers of candidates even at O Level – where it had overtaken German by 1984.55  
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A similar pattern naturally registered at university.  Science and especially Engineering lost 
share;  humanities generally retained their share (History lost a little ground);  while social 
studies grew, with a peak share of degrees at 26% in 1977.  As we have seen, however, it was 
in the polytechnic sector that the swing away from science was benefiting the wider range of 
courses.  At degree level in the polys, there was a big swing not only towards social studies, 
but also towards Creative Arts, humanities, and Education (now migrating from teacher-
training colleges to polytechnics as its own degree subject).   By 1980 science and technology 
held only about the same share as social studies, 25%, with Creative Arts, humanities and 
Education all still growing. 
We can ask the same set of questions about the swing to social studies (and, to a lesser 
extent, to Creative Arts) that we asked about the swing away from science:  what caused it,   
and what relative weights can we assign to the influences of interest, enjoyment, ability, 
earnings potential, career choice?  We have already seen a number of cohort effects that help 
to explain this swing.  A widening range of achievement and rising uptake of non-
compulsory education by girls devalued Physics and Maths and favoured Geography, 
History, English and Biology, all seen by girls as easy and interesting.  Pupils’ judgement of 
the freedom and social benefit afforded by the various subjects had the same effects, though 
less so for History.  Creativity was a newly professed goal, evident in the rise of Art as an A 
Level subject and, from the late 1970s, at degree level in the polytechnics.  Pupils of both 
sexes were more explicit about seeking fulfilment and self-development through their 
academic studies, and girls about social service.
56
   
Structural effects also benefited social studies.  Unlike the sciences or even the 
humanities, degree courses in social studies had no or few A Level requirements, so they 
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recruited from specialists in both.
57
  The loosening of the link between school subjects, 
degree subjects and occupation encouraged freedom of choice.  And as we have also seen, 
this did open up subject choice to more cultural influences, not only negative influences 
pushing young people away from science but also positive influences pushing them towards 
social studies.  Girls were particularly apt to voice these positive impressions.  Girls’ subject 
choices had always exhibited a traditional bent towards social service, which owed much to 
the fact that girls unlike boys had to find some selfless rationale to justify further education 
and vocationalism, and before the 1970s this usually ended up as a choice for teacher 
training.  In the 1970s and ‘80s, as women entered a wider variety of occupations, at a time 
when teacher training was being severely cut back, social studies seemed to combine social 
service with a number of the most popular new careers, in social work, personnel, commerce 
and local government.
58
  Biology led to another new set of graduate professions in subjects 
related to medicine – pharmacy, ophthalmology, nursing – none of which expected a 
background in Physics or Chemistry.
59
  Men, too, of course, were entering a widening array 
of occupations after university, notably business and management, and social studies were as 
useful a preparation for these careers as science.  There is even some evidence that the 
traditional graduate premium attaching to science degrees – resulting from higher incomes for 
the science-based professions in medicine, engineering and industry – was receding, and that 
social studies degrees were producing a premium of their own.
60
  Thus cohort effects, cultural 
effects, changes in the labour market and employers’ growing need for graduates of any kind 
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were all virtuously combining to favour social studies.   As by 1980 social studies had 
become by some way the largest group of degree subjects at polytechnics, too, with Creative 
Arts in second place, there was even at that stage evidence that the swing away from science 





In the early 1980s, as I discussed in my second address, Keith Joseph, as Thatcher’s 
Education Secretary, actually sought to do the reverse – to restrict higher education further, 
which he probably rightly thought would reverse the swing away from science and, more 
contentiously, make higher education better serve the needs of industry.
62
  Thus ‘manpower 
planning’, though Joseph fastidiously declined to name it as such, came briefly back into 
fashion under laissez-faire Conservative auspices;  but this moment did not last long, as in the 
mid-1980s Joseph was suddenly replaced by Kenneth Baker and government policy just as 
suddenly reversed from restriction to pell-mell expansion.   This anomalous early 1980s 
episode did have one lasting effect, which was to turn industry permanently into a lobby for 
science education.  In the 1960s, industry had been more wary of manpower planning 
because of its natural suspicions of Labour and suspicions, too, that industry would have to 
pay the bill for workplace training, through apprenticeships, training levies and the like.  In 
the 1980s, those suspicions dropped away, and, as Alison Wolf and Andrew Hacker have 
shown, in both the U.S. and the U.K. industry joyfully lobbied for more training inside 
education that would be paid for by the taxpayer.   Ever since the 1980s, therefore, employers 
– especially engineering employers – have been campaigning loudly and vigorously for more 
government subsidy of science and technology education, while all the time reducing their 
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own training costs and often their wage bills.
 63
  This campaigning has figured prominently in 
a succession of government reports, vowing ‘to change the subject balance within higher 
education’ towards science and technology, though without until recently any evident effect 
on outcomes.
64
  By 2004 one official survey could count 480 separate government initiatives 
aimed at boosting student numbers in STEM subjects.
65
 
Our historical perspective has already told us what informed commentators of the 
time suspected would happen when post-compulsory education was dramatically expanded, 
starting in the late 1980s.   The new cohorts of university entrants brought with them the 
subject choices they were already leaning towards in the polytechnics in the 1980s – not only 
because the polytechnics were now universities, but also because the universities were 
expanding rapidly themselves and bringing in similar new entrants.   The cohort of university 
entrants was very different from what it had been even at the previous peak of expansion in 
the late 1960s.  Students with no family background in higher education and with fewer 
formal academic attainments now predominated, overwhelmingly.  So, increasingly, did 
women – a majority of undergraduates by 1996, 56% today.   Although these new entrants 
did tend to emphasize their vocational goals in choosing subjects at university, their own 
families’ experience of the graduate labour market was so minimal, and the graduate labour 
market was changing so rapidly, that their subject choices continued to be driven by the 
traditional determinants of interest, enjoyment and prior attainment.   And given the striking 
fact that the graduate premium (the additional income graduates could expect over those with 
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fewer qualifications) remained high and stable throughout this rapid period of expansion, 
there was little incentive – or little knowledge of any incentive – to choose otherwise.66   
In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the swing away from science 
resumed, with a particularly sharp drop in the sciences’ total share of university degrees over 
the course of the 1990s when the higher education participation rate jumped from 14% to 
over 30%.  From a late ‘60s peak of 54 % of all degrees science’s share fell to a nadir in 2010 
of 38%.
67
  Within the sciences, Biology continued its inexorable rise – overtaking in terms of 
A Level passes both Physics (easily) and Chemistry (less dramatically) at precisely the point 
of transition to mass higher education.  Strikingly, the number (not merely the share) of A 




In the continuing swing away from science, ‘social studies’ remained the principal 
beneficiary, though within social studies the social sciences had stopped growing while 
business and commerce boomed, the latter overtaking the former in 1996.   Other boom 
subjects were increasingly hard to categorize, reflecting the diversification of the disciplines, 
a growing tendency for candidates to take A Levels in both science and arts subjects 
(encouraged by the introduction of AS Level in 2000), and the ever-widening extension of 
the graduate labour market.   One new subject lies on the borderland between science and 
social studies – Psychology – which now matches Biology in numbers of A Level candidates, 
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benefiting from the gender swing, presumed applicability to a wide range of jobs in the 
welfare and helping professions, and probably also from a cultural shift towards questions of 
social and personal identity.  Another new subject group lies on the borderland between 
social studies and humanities – Communications, which includes both business-related and 
humanities-related subjects, including Media Studies and Cultural Studies.  Education, now 
an all-graduate profession, with its own degrees as well as graduates in other subjects, also 
leans towards the humanities.  And the Creative Arts, which had hardly figured at all as 
degree-level subjects at universities, grew robustly in share through the 2000s, reaching a 
peak in 2012 at 11% of all degrees granted, matching the levels of the traditional humanities.   
Indeed, if one were to seek to measure the relative fortunes of the sciences and humanities, 
broadly construed, the humanities did much better in the period of rapid expansion since the 
late 1980s, largely because the Creative Arts did so much better than the only new science 
degree subjects, those subjects allied with medicine such as pharmacy and nursing.  But even 
some traditional humanities subjects have benefited from expansion. (Fig. 5)  Though 
languages have suffered a long decline, A Level passes in History have doubled since 1985, a 
faster rate of growth than Biology, Business, Art or indeed any traditional subject.  English, a 
compulsory examined subject for all secondary school pupils for the first time after GCSE 
was introduced in the late 1980s, benefited most;  it had always been the most popular 
humanities subject at 16, but it was now even moreso at 16 and 18. (Fig. 4) 
If we stand back and survey the entire trajectory from the 1950s nearly up to the 
present, the overall trends in subject choice are clear enough, though the multiple factors 
behind those trends remain hard to disentangle.  Expansion of post-compulsory education 
meant a long and sustained swing away from science, despite repeated insistence by 
policymakers and industrial employers that ‘national needs’ required a swing in the other 




principally Biology and Psychology.  The greatest beneficiary of the swing was the odd 
ragbag of subjects that get categorized as ‘social studies’ – initially, social sciences;  
increasingly, Business and Commerce;  but also humanities-leaning subjects such as 
Communications and Education.  While the traditional humanities experience a swing similar 
to (but not as sharp as) the swing away from science, they are fortified by the recruitment of 
new subjects in the Creative Arts, greater than the recruitment by science of subjects allied to 
medicine.   
I have shown that many of these trends can be traced back to the democratization of 
education itself, as new entrants – women, students from less academic backgrounds or fewer 
academic qualifications, and latterly ethnic minorities – prefer social studies and humanities 
to science.  These cohort effects, however, interact subtly with economic and cultural effects.  
Whatever industrial employers claim, the graduate labour market, as it expands, has less need 
for science graduates specifically and more for ‘graduateness’ unconnected to subject, thus 
facilitating freer choice.  Employers in the growing sectors – retail, clerical, and for much of 
our period the public sector – need supervisory skills and analytical skills, but not technical 
skills, and in their employing behaviours (rather than in industrial employers’ propaganda) 
are ‘screening’ candidates either for ‘graduateness’ or for other cognitive and behavioural 
characteristics, rather than seeking job-specific skills from education.  Both the cohort effects 
and the widening of the graduate labour market chime with students’ higher prioritization 
since the 1960s of self-understanding, self-development and creativity.  What is interesting to 
consider, therefore, is the possibility that the sheer fact of democratization – widening 
participation in post-compulsory education – is itself driving all these factors.   A more 
diverse cohort necessarily brings a wider range of motivations into higher education, and as it 
is dominated by students with less academic background it is likely to introduce less 




market also suggests that they will be less purposefully vocational in their choices, even 
though they are more likely to badge their choices as vocational, to justify (mainly to their 
parents) staying on in the first place.
69
  The graduate labour market then ratifies this decision 
by not placing very much weight on the subject of the degree.  And the diversification of 
subject choice may even be responsible for, rather than simply reactive to, cultural values, as 
the average graduate – less technically oriented, more female, open to a wider range of 
occupations – is now more likely to appear as a ‘seeker’ than as a young, upper or middle-




But this story has a sting in its tail.  Three factors in the last decade have (or could 
have) suddenly changed the calculus lying behind subject choice.  Most important is probably 
the slump of 2008 and its aftermath, which is widely held to have disadvantaged especially 
the bottom end of the graduate pool, seen increasingly to be ‘overeducated’ and thus doomed 
to ‘graduate’ careers as baristas and shelf-stackers.  In fact, the graduate premium has not 
shown much sign of declining – employers still favour graduates over non-graduates.  Still, 
the slump might well have raised future earnings in the hierarchy of students’ subject-choice 
calculations.  Then in 2012 tuition fees were trebled to £9000 a year.  Funded primarily 
through income-contingent loans, high tuition fees might not have focused students’ minds 
further on future earnings but they have certainly focused ministers’ minds:  for the first time, 
the lower the graduate’s earnings, the higher the payout from the Treasury.  Finally, as a 
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result of both these factors as well as the well-documented politicians’ propensity to do this 
anyway (with as ever help from the engineering employers), a more explicit campaign is now 
under way to steer students towards science.  Perhaps the most egregious illustration of this 
came in a speech (in the offices of Google, no less) by the Education Secretary, Nicky 
Morgan, in November 2014 which decried the last generation of careers advice as steering 
pupils towards the arts and humanities when, she claimed, ‘now we know…that the subjects 
that keep young people’s options open and unlock doors to all sorts of careers are the STEM 
subjects’.71  No wonder some people have taken to calling the current period ‘the age of 
STEM’.72 
This rhetoric, I hope you will recognize, is terribly familiar;  politicians of all parties 
have been trying to reverse the swing away from science since it began in the early ‘60s 
(while often also trumpeting ‘student choice’).  But under the triple-whammy of slump, fees 
and a concerted propaganda campaign who is to say that this time it might not work?  Since 
2008 the biggest growth subject at A Level has been Maths, though the curve for other major 
subjects has been pretty flat. (Fig. 2)  Since 2012, the first year of full-fees graduates, the 
swing away from science has for the first time in 50 years halted and gone into reverse.  The 
humanities have not gone into sharp decline, but their historic slow decline in relative share 
has continued as science’s has not, and for the first time the traditional humanities’ decline 
has not been compensated for by a growth in the Creative Arts, which have levelled off since 
2011. (Fig. 5) 
This trend may continue;  it may not;  it is too soon to tell, and it is not for an historian 
to predict the future.  Still, I want to conclude with a warning from history.  The swing to 
STEM may be built on false promises, if students are being persuaded to choose subjects 
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against their natural inclinations based on the prospect of higher future earnings.  A recent 
study by a team of economics for the Institute of Fiscal Studies has begun to track the 
correlation between choice of subject and subsequent earnings.   It demonstrates considerable 
variation in mean earnings between subjects, with Creative Arts and Communications at the 
low end and Medicine, Economics, Engineering, Law and Physics at the high end.  This 
would seem to confirm the rewards to many STEM subjects and the low returns for some of 
the fastest-growing non-STEM subjects, and to justify a swing to STEM as serving 
employers’ and perhaps thus national needs.  The same study, however, also controls these 
returns for student characteristics, including age, region, prior attainment and parental 
income.  Once you control for student characteristics, the disparities are much reduced – what 
appears to be a clear hierarchy at the median now dissolves into a pretty flat picture where 
subject choice doesn’t seem to make that much difference to returns to education (with the 
clear exception of medicine).  (Interestingly, choice of university seems to remain more 
important than choie of subject, even after controls for student characteristics are applied.)
73
 
From this we might conclude, as we have concluded from some historical evidence 
that I have presented in my third and fourth addresses, that the economic rewards to 
education may not be so much rewards to specific skills or subjects as rewards to other 
characteristics, notably the generic analytic skills associated with ‘graduateness’ and the 
behavioural characteristics associated with class.  Employers don’t make much distinction 
between degree subjects, but they do make a distinction between graduates and non-
graduates, and among graduates between those who share certain other characteristics – age, 
region, prior attainment, parental income – and those who don’t.  They use degree subject and 
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  Jack Britton, Lorraine Dearden, Neil Shephard and Anna Vignoles, ‘How English Domiciled Graduate 
Earnings Vary with Gender, Institution Attended, Subject and Socio-Economic Background’, IFS Working 
Paper W16/06 (Apr. 2016), esp. Figs. 3, 4, 5.  For some earlier attempts based on British Household Panel and 
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1177-86;  Ian Walker and Yu Zhu, ‘The Impact of University Degrees on the Lifecycle of Earnings:  Some 




institution, in other words, to screen for candidates who share more generically valued 
characteristics.
74
   
If this is true, then driving more students to STEM may have a series of perverse and 
unintended consequences.  It may lead to more failure amongst lower-income students whose 
prior attainment and whose own preferences would have led them elsewhere, a result which 
Andrew Hacker has already documented as a result of ludicrously high Maths requirements 
in U.S. high schools.
75
  One government aim – more STEM students – is thus likely to 
frustrate another aim – widening participation.  Or it may lead to an over-supply of STEM 
graduates, as those graduates find that their artificially-generated STEM skills don’t help 
them much in the labour market, when really employers had been using STEM skills to 
screen for something else, which these new STEM graduates lack – favoured background and 
prior attainment.   It will of course please the engineering employers, who, as Hacker again 
suggests, will now be in a position possibly to spend less on training and certainly to spend 
less on wages.
76
  Above all, it seems to me, seeking to override traditional student preferences 
for subjects that they enjoy and are good at, in favour of possibly illusory effects on the 
labour market and on economic growth, is likely to make education less fulfilling and more 
frustrating.      
The degree of specificity in the IFS study about the returns to particular kinds of 
student, particular universities and particular subjects is only possible because of access to 
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information about parental income and graduate income newly available from HMRC and the 
Student Loan Company.  Government has facilitated this access because it wishes itself to 
measure the degree of subsidy that it is providing through the student loan regime to specific 
courses at specific universities.   That might be all to the good, if the goal is to show that 
courses chosen by less advantaged students – Creative Arts at post-1992 universities, for 
example – are being subsidized more, much as the pupil premium subsidizes less advantaged 
students in schools.  It is doubtful that that is the government’s goal, however.  It seems more 
likely that its aim will be to put pressure on the more subsidized courses as part of a broader 
campaign to push less advantaged students towards STEM.  I have suggested some reasons 
why that won’t work, or if it does work might have perverse consequences.  The threat of 
new league tables based on graduate income – or the reality of a new Teaching Excellence 
Framework based on alleged ‘value added’ by subject – will be among the greatest challenges 
my successors will have to face.  I hope this evening to have added some arguments to their 







Caption:  Attitudes to subjects among Lancashire grammar-school students in the early 1970s 
Source:  D. Duckworth & N.J. Entwistle, ‘The Swing from Science:  A Perspective from 












Caption:  Science A Levels, England (in thousands) 
Source:  Statistics of Education, Vol. 2 (1961-79), Statistics of School Leavers, CSE and 
GCE (1980-85), Statistics of Education:  Public Examinations GCSE and GCE (England) 
(1992-2000), GCE/Applied GCE A/AS and Equivalent Examination Results in England, 
2009/10 (Revised):  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110907100731/http://education.gov.uk/rsgatewa
y/DB/SFR/s000986/index.shtml, accessed 7.9.16 (2000-10);  Subject Time Series Tables, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/a-level-and-other-level-3-results-2014-to-2015-






































































































Caption:   Science degrees as percentage of all first degrees in universities, UK 
Source:  Education Statistics of the United Kingdom (to 1978), Statistics of Education, Vol. 
6:  Universities, GB only (1979), Universities' Statistical Record, University Statistics, Vol. 
1:  Students and Staff (1980-85), Higher Education Statistics for the United Kingdom, GB 
only 1993-95 (1993-97), Higher Education Statistical Agency online (1998-).  Values for 
















Caption:  Humanities A Levels, England (in thousands) 











































































































Caption:  Science, Humanities and Creative Arts degrees as percentage of all first degrees in 
universities, UK 
Source:  As Fig. 3.   
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